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Drivers and Obstacles to Banking SMEs: 





Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) are important for employment and economic activity; however, 
they are perceived to lack adequate financing, which hampers their growth. As a consequence, 
governments have implemented a number of programs to foster SME lending and attention has 
focused on improving the institutional environment, such that the financial system is more willing to 
lend to SMEs. In this paper, we directly ask banks (the main providers of SME external finance) what 
factors they perceive as drivers and obstacles to financing SMEs. We also study to what degree 
competition and the institutional framework play a role in banks’ decisions. To do so, we use a unique 
survey of banks in Argentina and Chile, two neighboring emerging countries with significant 
differences in how their institutional environments are viewed, and thus expected to shape banks’ 
willingness to deal with SMEs. The paper shows that, despite alleged differences in the countries’ 
environments regarding rules, regulations, institutions, and ease of doing business, SMEs have become 
a strategic segment for most banks in both countries. In particular, banks have begun to target SMEs 
due to the significant competition in the corporate and retail sectors. They perceive the SME market as 
highly profitable, large, and with good prospects. Moreover, banks are developing coping mechanisms 
to overcome the particular institutional obstacles present in each country and to compete for SMEs. 
Banks’ interest in SMEs is not based on government programs, yet policy action might help reduce the 
cost of providing financing, especially long-term lending. 
JEL Code: G21, G28, L25, O12, O16. 
Keywords: small and medium enterprises, bank finance, financial constraints, banking market 
structure, institutional factors, regulation, competition. 
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How small and medium enterprises (SMEs) finance their operations is a 
subject of significant interest to policymakers and researchers alike. SMEs account for 
a sizeable share of overall employment levels in both developed and developing 
countries.
1 Furthermore, since most large companies usually start as small enterprises, 
the viability of SMEs becomes crucial to any economy wishing to prosper. Concerns 
are compounded by evidence showing that SMEs tend to be more financially 
constrained than large firms and that lack of access to finance is an important obstacle 
to their growth. In particular, SMEs find it difficult to obtain external financing from 
banks and capital markets given their size and characteristic opaqueness.
2  
As a consequence of this perceived lack of financing and given the segment’s 
economic importance, governments around the world have implemented a number of 
programs to foster SME lending.
3 They have included subsidized or favorable loans, 
guarantees, and special lines of credit by certain banks (typically public banks), 
usually for particular economic sectors.
4 More recently, governments have 
participated in programs to foster factoring and structured products that allow bank 
financing to reach SMEs by including large corporations and special purpose vehicles 
to decrease problems of moral hazard and asymmetric information.
5  
Aside from government programs to finance SMEs, what other factors can 
help alleviate SME financing constraints? An extensive literature has shown that 
                                                 
1 Using data from 1990-99 for 76 countries, Ayyagari, Beck, and Demirguc-Kunt (2007) show that on 
average SMEs account for 55% of employment in manufacturing. In Argentina and Chile, SMEs 
account for 70% and 86% of manufacturing employment, respectively. 
2 For evidence that SMEs tend to be more financially constrained than large firms, see Schiffer and 
Weder (2001), IADB (2004), Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2005), and Beck, Demirgüç-
Kunt, Laeven, and Maksimovic (2006). Furthermore, Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2005) 
show that lack of access to external finance is a key obstacle to firm growth, especially for SMEs  
3 Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Honohan (2008) provide a survey of policies undertaken by governments 
to improve financial access by households and firms. 
4 See Beck, Klapper, and Mendoza (2008) for a survey on partial credit guarantee schemes around the 
world. 
5 See de la Torre, Gozzi, and Schmukler (2007). 
  1access to external financing and firm growth are shaped by legal institutions.
6 In other 
words, in countries with better institutional environments, financing obstacles are 
smaller and firms obtain more external financing and are able to grow faster. More 
importantly, recent research using firm-level data has shown that SMEs seem to 
benefit the most from improvements in the institutional environment.
7  
In this paper, rather than focusing on firms’ perceptions regarding SME 
financing (as has been the case with most of recent studies), we analyze the factors 
banks perceive as drivers and obstacles to lending to SMEs. Of particular interest is 
the role of the competitive and institutional environments in shaping SME lending, 
and more generally banks’ interest in dealing with SMEs. By competition we refer to 
the competition banks face in the SME and other segments, which affect their 
behavior. By institutional factors we refer to the rules and regulations that affect the 
functioning of the financial system and influence the operation of the private sector, 
as well as the more general macroeconomic environment that shapes financial 
contracts. In this category, we also include government programs that foster lending 
to SMEs.  
To study the role of the competitive and institutional environments, we 
compare banks’ perceptions about SMEs in Argentina and Chile.
8 We use a survey 
that covers a wide range and a significant proportion of banks in these countries. The 
                                                 
6 See, for example, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997, 1998), Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (1998), Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2005), and Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, 
Laeven, and Maksimovic (2006). 
7 Using data from 4,000 firms in 54 countries, Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2005) show 
that marginal changes in the institutional environment result in financing and legal obstacles having a 
smaller negative impact on firm growth, and this effect is larger for SMEs. Using a similar database, 
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2008) show that SMEs gain greater access to bank finance as 
a result of improvements in property rights. 
8 The World Bank has also recently conducted studies of SME financing in Colombia (Stephanou and 
Rodriguez, 2008) and Serbia (World Bank, 2007b). Using data for a sample of banks in developed and 
developing countries and SMEs in Latin America, de la Torre, Martínez Pería, and Schmukler (2008) 
claim that even large and foreign banks might have incentives and a comparative advantage in serving 
SMEs through alternative models to relationship lending. 
  2surveys were conducted in December of 2006, a period of macroeconomic stability in 
both countries. A data request that accompanied the survey allowed us to gather 
information for some variables for both 2005 and 2006.
9 Although the analysis 
focuses just on banks, it is relevant because banks seem to be the main providers of 
external finance (from the financial sector) to SMEs in both places.  
The comparison between Argentina and Chile is of particular interest. The two 
countries are neighbors, they are both growing, emerging economies, and they have 
implemented many financial reforms over the last decades to foster competition and 
create a market-friendly environment, establishing regulations and institutions that 
foster market development. As part of this trend, both Argentina and Chile 
experienced the arrival of foreign banks during the 1990s, which now hold a 
significant market share (26% in Argentina and 64% in Chile). In several cases, the 
same international banks have started operations in both countries, a fact that allows 
us to compare their approach to SMEs in different settings. Moreover, Chile suffered 
an economic slowdown after the Asian crisis, during 1998-99, while Argentina had a 
severe economic crisis during 2001-02, which involved reprogramming of bank 
deposits, the conversion of dollar deposits to peso deposits, and debt default. Both 
economies recovered afterwards, with their banking systems affected in very distinct 
ways.  
Besides the analogies between Argentina and Chile, there are also significant 
differences in how the institutional environment is perceived to work in each country. 
According to several widely used indicators, Chile’s institutional environment is 
perceived to rank better than Argentina’s. For example, the Institutional Development 
                                                 
9 In particular, we collected data on the number of branches and personnel dedicated to serving SMEs, 
the number of deposits from SMEs, the number of SME debtors and loans, and the value of loans to 
SMEs.  
  3component of the Global Competitiveness Index produced by the World Economic 
Forum, which ranks countries from best to worst institutional environment, ranks 
Chile in 23
rd place out of 131 countries, while it ranks Argentina in 123
rd place.
10 The 
World Bank’s Governance Indicators also rank Chile better than Argentina in terms 
of regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. With higher rankings here 
indicating better outcomes, Chile is in the 90
th percentile in terms of regulatory 
quality, rule of law, and control of corruption, while Argentina ranks in the 20
th to 40
th 
percentile depending on the indicator considered.
11 According to The Heritage 
Foundation’s  Property Rights Index (one of the components in the Economic 
Freedom Index), Chile stands at 90 while Argentina receives a 30, with higher 
numbers (on a scale from 0 to 100) indicating greater protection of property rights.
12 
Finally, the Doing Business in Latin America 2008 report shows that Chile ranks 
better than Argentina in terms of legal rights protection and regarding the time and 
cost to register property (World Bank, 2007c). Given all these alleged differences in 
the institutional environments in Argentina and Chile, this paper studies whether 
banks view them as shaping their involvement with SMEs.  
The paper’s main findings regarding banks’ perceived drivers and obstacles to 
financing SMEs are as follows. First, despite the mentioned institutional differences, 
SMEs have become a strategic sector for most banks in both countries. Furthermore, 
banks perceive the SME lending market as large, unsaturated, and with good 
prospects. In other words, while the literature argues that the institutional environment 
is important for SME financing and that the perceived institutional differences 
between Argentina and Chile are large, banks’ interest in SMEs does not seem to vary 
                                                 
10 Rankings can be found at http://www.gcr.weforum.org/. 
11 See Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2008) for a detailed description of these governance 
indicators. For rankings, go to http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp. 
12 Data for the Heritage Foundation Index of Property Rights can be downloaded from   
http://www.heritage.org/research/features/index/downloads.cfm. 
  4significantly across these countries. Second, the interest in SMEs is not based on 
government programs. Banks seem to be focusing on SMEs because, among other 
things, they argue that the segment’s profitability will more than compensate for the 
higher implied costs and risks, especially given thinning margins in the corporate and 
retail sectors due to competition in those segments. Third, since banks have developed 
coping mechanisms to deal with potential institutional deficiencies, they do not 
perceive any obstacles significantly impeding them from serving the segment. In other 
words, the potential benefits of serving SMEs have generated incentives for banks to 
develop ways to overcome the institutional limitations they perceive as obstacles. 
Fourth, in the case of international banks present in both countries, the strategies to 
engage SMEs across countries are remarkably similar, which suggests that banks are 
exporting their business models to places with different institutions. Finally, the 
institutional environments appear to be more relevant for certain types of financing, 
like long-term loans in fixed rates in domestic currency. Thus, policy action might 
focus on complementing what banks need to expand their participation and provide 
the type of financing that might still be lacking. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the survey used and the 
data gathered. Section 3 discusses the extent and type of bank engagement with SMEs 
and analyzes whether there are significant differences across countries, bank 
ownership types, size, and location. Section 4 analyzes the drivers of this involvement 
and Section 5 describes banks’ perceived obstacles. In both sections, we investigate 
whether there is heterogeneity depending on country or bank characteristics. Section 6 
discusses in more detail the role of competition and government programs. Section 7 
concludes. 
 
  52.  Data 
Our analysis is based on information gathered by means of on-site interviews 
conducted in 2006 with banks’ top management, the use of a tabulated questionnaire, 
and a detailed data request, covering the period 2005-2006, designed to obtain unique 
information on bank lending to SMEs, which are not available to the Central Banks of 
each country. The interviews and data processing are confidential, so banks felt 
practically no constraint in sharing their information, with the understanding that the 
data would be reported in an aggregate way, without disclosing each bank’s strategy 
or positions. The questionnaire was designed to address three broad areas: (1) 
measuring the extent of bank involvement with SMEs, (2) learning about the 
determinants of the degree of bank financing to SMEs, such as demand factors, 
competition, corporate strategy, and macroeconomic, regulatory, and institutional 
factors, and (3) understanding the business model and risk management process that 
banks use when working with SMEs. 
The survey covers 14 banks in Argentina: six foreign, six private domestic, 
and two public, which account for 75% of the banking system’s total assets.
13 Out of 
14 banks, four are regional banks and ten have operations nationwide.
14 In Chile, the 
survey covers eight banks: four foreign, three private domestic, and one public, which 
represent 79% of the banking system’s total assets. All Chilean banks have operations 
nationwide.
15 In each bank, we tried to carry out separate interviews with the general 
manager (to understand the determinants of the bank’s involvement with SMEs), the 
SME business manager (to assess the business model for dealing with SMEs), and the 
credit risk manager (to comprehend how risks are controlled). The percentages 
                                                 
13 Total assets stands for liquid assets, public and private securities, loans, and other banks’ assets. 
14 The regional banks have operations in six regions or less, while the national banks are present in 17 
regions or more (compared to the 24 available regions in Argentina). In the regressions, we use the 
percentage of regions in which the bank has operations as a proxy for bank location.      
15 All banks have operations in ten regions or more (compared to 13 available regions in Chile).  
  6presented in this paper are calculated based on the sample of total banks interviewed 
that have SMEs among their clients (13 Argentine banks and eight Chilean Banks). 
The percentages are usually calculated for the aggregate sample of Argentina and 
Chile, and when considered relevant, these percentages are presented by country or 
type of bank. 
To classify SMEs, all the banks interviewed use average annual sales. 
However, a variety of ranges is observed, indicating that there is not a unified 
criterion to define the segment as a whole. In Argentina, the Central Bank and the 
SME Secretary (SEPyME) have established their official definitions for small 
enterprises (SEs) and medium enterprises (MEs), but most banks do not follow either 
of them. The fact that banks do not adopt similar definitions for SMEs reflects the 
heterogeneity of the banking system. For example, large international banks usually 
serve SMEs with high average sales, while small banks tend to focus on smaller 
SMEs.  
The ranges of average annual sales used to classify SEs and MEs differ 
between Argentina and Chile, reflecting the different size of their economies. In 
Argentina, a company is considered to be an SE when its average annual sales are 
approximately between US$300,000 and US$5,000,000. MEs are those with annual 
sales between US$5,000,000 and US$30,000,000. In Chile, these ranges have lower 
values: SEs have average annual sales of approximately US$90,000-US$1,600,000 
and MEs of US$1,600,000-US$2,3800,000.
16 All the companies with average annual 
sales below these ranges are considered to be micro enterprises and those above 
belong to the corporate sector. It should be noted that in Argentina, loans of 
AR$500,000 (US$ 166,667), or less can be treated as consumption loans according to 
                                                 
16 These ranges were calculated as the average minimum and the average maximum values of the 
criteria banks use to define SEs and MEs.   
  7Central Bank (BCRA) regulations, even when they are granted to a company (as long 
as the total debt the client has with the bank does not exceed this amount).  
In the rest of the paper, we ignore the heterogeneity of ranges observed in the 
definition of SMEs and use whatever definition banks use to define them. To some 
degree, this makes the comparison across banks with very different definitions 
difficult. Nonetheless, it is useful to analyze how banks conduct business with what 
they consider to be SEs and MEs. Moreover, it would be very difficult to construct 
another working definition.  
 
3.  Extent and Type of SME Involvement 
Bank involvement with SMEs in Argentina and Chile appears to be 
significant. All banks interviewed have SMEs among their clients, with the exception 
of one Argentine bank, which was planning to enter the middle-market segment. The 
importance of the SME segment has increased to the point that more than 80% of the 
banks interviewed have created a separate unit to serve it.
17 In both countries there 
appears to be an integral relation with SMEs. Moreover, bank exposure to SMEs 
appears not to be limited to specific economic sectors or geographic regions.
18  
Banks have a significant level of exposure to the SME segment in terms of 
loans, and this exposure is higher in Argentina than in Chile. The exposure to SMEs is 
measured as the ratio of SME loans to total outstanding private sector loans (including 
retail). In 2006, SMEs represented 37% of total bank loans to the private sector in 
Argentina and 13% in Chile.
19 These ratios are very similar for 2005. The level of 
exposure of the most involved and  medium involved banks is unexpectedly high, 
                                                 
17 In Argentina 77% and in Chile 87% of banks interviewed have separate SME, or SE and ME units.  
18 See de la Torre, Martínez Pería, Politi, Schmukler, and Vanasco (2008) for an analysis of the 
business model and risk management practices banks use to serve SMEs. 
19 The banks that provided this information and that are considered in this average account for 64% of 
total private sector loans in Argentina and 80% of total private sector loans in Chile.   
  8representing on average 62% and 28% of the banks’ loan portfolios respectively.
20 On 
average, private domestic banks are the most exposed to the segment in both 
countries, with a level of exposure of 56% in Argentina and 16% in Chile. In 
Argentina, private domestic banks are followed by public banks (31%) and foreign 
banks (27%), while in Chile they are followed by foreign banks (12%).
21,22 
Table 1 provides a more formal examination of differences in banks’ 
involvement with SMEs along several dimensions using Tobit estimations.
23 The 
dependent variables are constructed with unique quantitative bank data for 2005 and 
2006 on the share of branches that service SMEs to total bank branches, the fraction 
of banks’ personnel dedicated to SMEs, the proportion of the number of SME 
deposits to total number of bank deposits, the share of SME debtors to total number of 
bank debtors, the proportion of the number of loans to SMEs relative to the total 
private sector loans, and the share of lending to SMEs to total private sector lending.  
The results show that banks in Argentina are to some extent more involved 
with SMEs than in Chile, according to the shares related to deposits and lending. In 
fact, no indicator shows that banks are more involved in Chile than in Argentina. This 
suggests that the institutional environment, which is weaker in Argentina, has not 
been a constraint for banks to operate with SMEs in that country. Private foreign 
banks have fewer branches that serve SMEs than public and private domestic banks 
do, but that does not mean that they are less involved with SMEs. Relative to public 
                                                 
20 These are simple averages of the ratio of SME loans to private sector loans for the banks that belong 
to each category: most involved and medium involved banks. The most involved banks are the top third 
of banks with the highest share of SME loans as percentage of total loans. The least involved banks are 
the bottom third of banks with the lowest share of SME loans as percentage of total loans. The medium 
involved banks are the ones that do not fall in either category.  
21 These ratios are calculated as the sum of SME loans over the sum of private sector loans considering 
the banks belonging to each category of bank type (public, private domestic and foreign). 
22 Despite the increasing importance of SMEs, most banks are not yet able to measure their exposure to 
the segment in terms of income, costs, or risk.  
23 Since the number of observations is limited, we report throughout the paper both bivariate 
regressions (with the exception of the one with the two bank-type dummies) and multivariate 
regressions.  
  9banks, private banks have a higher fraction of loans and amount lent to SMEs as well 
as a higher share of SME debtors. Banks with higher overall market share (large 
banks) have a higher fraction of the number of SME deposits, but that does not imply 
that they lend more. They have a lower share of lending and a lower proportion of 
number of loans to SMEs. That is, banks do not necessarily engage with SMEs 
primarily through lending.
24 
In terms of the products banks use to engage with SMEs, bank lending is 
mainly short term, which might be explained by the institutional framework.
25 The 
most important lending products are short-term loans and overdrafts both in Argentina 
and Chile; these are geared toward financing working capital. These products are 
followed by leasing and investment loans (Figure 1). Pre-trade financing is also 
considered important in both countries. Document and check discounting is the 
second leading product in Argentina but is not mentioned at all by Chilean banks, 
while factoring is a very important product in Chile but is not considered significant 
by Argentine banks. However, these products are similar since they enable companies 
to receive payments in advance at a certain discount. The main difference between 
check discounting and factoring lies in the instrument that is being discounted: in 
Argentina it is relatively easy for the bearer of a check to claim the corresponding 
payment since the check is an “executive title,” while the bearer of a company receipt 
is unable to do so because company receipts are typically not executive titles.
26 In 
                                                 
24 This result is not necessarily surprising. While small banks can only make small loans due to 
concentration limits on lending, large banks can make large loans and hence proportionally their 
involvement with SMEs, measured by the share of lending, will be lower. 
25 For 111 institutions of Latin America and the Caribbean, a survey conducted by FELABAN (2007) 
shows that 52% of the banks offer short-term commercial loans for working capital investments, 14% 
of these banks include long-terms loans, and 18% do not have an active credit policy. 
26 An instrument is an “executive title” if it is established by law that the payment obligation it 
represents must be met. This category cannot be established by the parties involved in a transaction, but 
rather it can only be designated by law since it reflects a public interest that the obligations in certain 
types of instruments are fulfilled. Therefore, the holder of an “executive title” can forcefully demand 
the compliance of its payment. In Argentina, some receipts can become executive titles if they are 
  10Chile “the use of factoring has been facilitated after a recent legal reform that made 
the factura an executive title.”
27  
Based on the data received from banks in Argentina, working capital loans 
represent approximately 60% of the SME loans, while investment loans account for 
almost 20% of SME loans. In Chile, the distribution appears to be different since 
short-term and long-term products represent a similar proportion of total financing to 
SMEs; working capital and investment loans each represent around 40% of the SME 
portfolio. As for the term of investment loans, in Argentina the average term is 1,000 
days while in Chile it is 3,700 days (Figure 2). These stylized facts suggest that the 
SME lending market is more developed in Chile than in Argentina.  
Banks usually require some basic collateral to make loans. Approximately 
70% of the loans require collateral, and the collateral requirement represents, on 
average, 96% of the loan amount. Some banks mention that their collateral 
requirements are more flexible the larger the size of the company and others stress 
that the requirements are stricter for long-term loans. In general, banks prefer 
collateral that is easier to execute in case of default, however banks mostly maintain 
these strong collateral requirements as an incentive for debtors to repay as agreed.  
 
4.  Drivers of Bank Involvement with SMEs 
To understand what lies behind the figures on the extent and type of 
involvement described above, banks were asked to indicate the drivers of SME 
lending and to explain how significant these factors are in defining their level of 
involvement with the segment. Four main drivers were highlighted by banks in both 
countries (Figure 3).  
                                                                                                                                            
certified, which are then called “facturas conformadas,” but this is not usually done in practice. 
27 Quoted from bank interviews in Chile. 
  11First, the high level of perceived profitability of the segment was mentioned 
by banks as the main motivation to attract SME clients. A large majority of the banks 
consider that they will attain elevated profits that will more than compensate for the 
higher costs and risks of the segment. A common observation unveiled from 
interviews with managers is that the high profitability of working with SMEs not only 
derives from lending products, but also from the potential for cross-selling other 
products. Once the relation with the company is established, banks offer clients a 
variety of services and obtain an extremely significant proportion of their revenues 
from the fees they charge for these services. The potential for cross-sale that SMEs 
entail does not necessarily imply higher risk because no lending needs to be involved. 
Furthermore, many banks perceive the SME segment to be more profitable than 
corporate banking. This might be explained by the fact that spreads on corporate 
lending are near zero (due to high competition in both countries), so banks are looking 
for new markets to diversify their income sources. Moreover, in Argentina, the 
perceived risk of the corporate segment has increased because SMEs performed better 
than large companies during the 2001-2002 crisis. The Argentine crisis was 
particularly harmful for large corporations, especially utilities companies, although 
the recession the country experienced affected all the sectors of the economy. In that 
event, SMEs did not default by as much as large corporations, they made efforts to 
comply with their debt payments, and they recovered more quickly from the crisis.  
Second, almost 70% of the banks in Argentina and 25% of the banks in Chile 
mentioned the possibility to seek SMEs through relations with existing large clients as 
another significant driver of their involvement with the segment. Banks systematically 
ask large clients for references on their best clients and suppliers, which in many 
cases are SMEs. With a list of potential clients, banks contact these companies and try 
  12to convert them into clients by offering services or lending products, depending on the 
banks’ strategy. The benefit banks reap from this is not only that banks obtain an 
assessment of the quality of these SMEs from large clients, but also that these SMEs 
are supported by operating with these large corporations, who in some cases also 
provide guarantees. Thus, banks gain very useful information and reduce the risk of 
seeking new clients. In this way, banks exploit the synergies of working with different 
types of clients.
28 
Third, more than 40% of the banks (exclusively private ones) consider the 
SME segment to be a strategic sector. This is the third most mentioned driver in 
Argentina (54% of banks), while in Chile it is the fourth (25% of banks). The 
increased interest in the segment can be understood as a result of the change in 
industrial organization that Argentina and Chile have witnessed in the past few years. 
In the early 1990s, companies tended to be vertically integrated, so by serving a large 
company banks were able to service the entire chain of business. However, in the past 
five years many large companies appear to have outsourced processes to the SME 
segment, tending toward a modular integration, in which SMEs carry out these 
outsourced processes. Therefore, if banks want to service the entire chain of business 
they may need to lend to the SMEs that are responsible for the outsourced processes. 
Banks seem to have a new role as financial entities: to finance and provide services to 
the SMEs that carry out the outsourced processes and that tend to be supported by 
large corporations.  
                                                 
28 However, the way to approach to new SMEs does not seem to be fully standardized. Using 
information from existing firm databases, such as credit bureaus, relying on existing deposit clients, 
and attracting clients with bank credit are also other approaches that banks use to identify prospective 
SMEs. With a lower degree of importance, another practice observed is the incorporation of 
relationship managers from other banks, who bring their own client’s portfolio. A very small 
percentage of the banks also reveal that they target SMEs that are located close to their branches. The 
wide variety of methods that banks use to detect potential SME clients suggests the pro-active attitude 
of banks in reaching out to SMEs despite the strong demand. 
  13Fourth, another key driver, mentioned by more than a third of the banks as a 
reason for their interest in SMEs, is intense competition and exposure to the retail 
and/or corporate sectors. In Chile, the excessive exposure to other segments appears 
to be extremely relevant, since 75% of the banks consider it a key driver. The 
decreasing profitability noted in other segments, which is due to high competition, has 
induced banks to focus on SMEs. As mentioned above, competition is high in the 
corporate segment. A similar phenomenon is also observed in the consumer and micro 
segments, particularly in Chile. In Argentina, the consumer segment does not show 
decreasing profits; nonetheless, bank participation has grown in that segment at a 
rapid pace since the early 2000s, so it may be near saturation. This could explain why 
the future growth of Argentine and Chilean banks appears to rely strongly on the SME 
segment.  
Table 2 shows more formally, using ordered Probit regressions, how drivers 
vary across countries and bank characteristics. The results confirm the description 
above based on the figures and provide additional interesting insights. They basically 
show to what degree different drivers are more relevant for a particular country or 
type of bank.
29 The table shows that foreign banks see the profitability of the SME 
segment as an important driver. In Argentina, banks perceive the possibility to team 
up with large clients to be relatively more important. Competition for large corporates 
is more of a driver to engage with SMEs for large banks (since they are the only ones 
that have access to corporates to begin with). Meanwhile, competition for retail 
customers seem to be more relevant for private banks (both foreign and domestic), 
since they compete among themselves and with other non-bank financial 
intermediaries like retail chains. Exposure to large corporates seems to be more 
                                                 
29 We have also performed some estimations in which observations are pooled across similar variables 
(so the degrees of freedom increase) and obtained similar results. 
  14important for Argentine banks and for those with more geographic presence, while 
exposure to retail customers is more important for Argentine banks. Overall, the 
results show that given the incentives to seek profits through other segments, 
Argentine banks have reached out to SMEs despite the concerns with the institutional 
environment. 
 
5.  Obstacles to SME Lending 
While bank involvement with SMEs is driven by the factors mentioned above, 
it is also useful to assess the degree to which this involvement is affected by certain 
obstacles. Surprisingly, many of the obstacles often perceived as deterrents of 
engagement with SMEs are not considered significant by most banks. There are also 
some differences in perceptions across countries. Below we discuss the five most 
important factors perceived as obstacles by banks in Argentina and Chile.
30 See 
Figure 4 and Table 3. 
First, SME-specific factors are the only obstacle considered significant by 
both Argentine and Chilean banks (roughly 50% of the banks in each country). These 
are factors related solely to SMEs (i.e., intrinsic to their nature and behavior) and not 
to other firms that operate within the same regulatory and contractual environment. 
For example, informality and low quality balance sheets in Argentina, lack of quality 
information in Chile, and lack of adequate guarantees in both countries stand out as 
SME-specific factors that banks perceive as obstacles in serving these firms.
31 Note 
that lack of quality information is not mentioned at all by Argentine banks, but it is 
likely implicit in the response related to informality. In Chile, when explaining the 
                                                 
30 The obstacles are ranked based on the importance they have in the aggregated sample of Argentina 
and Chile. 
31 To increase the level and quality of information available to banks on firms (large corporates and 
SMEs), the Central Bank of Argentina is working toward the establishment of a “central de balances.” 
This database will contain economic and financial information about the business activity of firms. 
  15lack of quality information, banks mention that small enterprises have limited and 
non-standardized information and that financial statements are prepared only once a 
year (mainly for tax reporting purposes); besides, the cost to improve the information 
on SMEs are high and must be absorbed by the bank. Other factors stated are 
problems related to evaluating SME risk, the weakness of family management, the 
lack of SME associations for cooperation, and the fact that SMEs auto-exclude 
themselves from the banking system.  
Second, competition in the SME segment is considered a significant obstacle 
by 70% of the Argentine banks while in Chile it is not regarded as significant (only 
13% of the banks mention it as an obstacle). This of course is based on the banks’ 
perspective; while high competition is perceived as an obstacle by banks, it benefits 
SMEs. Narrow margins and the “distortions generated by public banks,” as stated by 
some banks, are considered to be important issues related to the high competition in 
the segment. The existence of niche banks and regional banks, the “unfair competition 
of large private banks,” and the fact that private banks usually dominate the high 
quality segment were also mentioned by banks. In Argentina, large and public banks 
are considered price-setters; they are perceived by other banks to set “predatory 
prices” to capture a larger share of the SME segment. This is particularly harmful for 
small and niche banks that do not have enough margins to compete with low rates. 
One important finding is that interest rates on loans do not necessarily reflect the risk 
of the client: they are determined by the high level of competition among banks. 
Private domestic banks consider competition in the SME segment as a key obstacle, 
while foreign and public banks do not. As mentioned above, foreign and public banks 
(and also the largest private domestic banks), are the main price setters in the market. 
Therefore, the small and medium private domestic banks have to compete with low 
  16rates to stay in the market and increase their market share.  
Third, another relevant obstacle mentioned is macroeconomic factors, which is 
considered significant by almost half of the Argentine banks, and by only 13% of the 
Chilean banks. Long-term instability, taxes, disincentives to foreign investors, and 
exchange rate risk are the main aspects banks mention in terms of macroeconomic 
obstacles. In particular, foreign banks give macroeconomic factors the greatest 
importance, while public banks do not even consider them impediments. One possible 
explanation for the fact that banks mention the macroeconomic factors and at the 
same time still engage with SMEs could be that banks have developed coping 
mechanisms to deal with long-term instability, such as using short-term loans, secured 
loans, and variable rates.
32 In fact, macroeconomic uncertainty (related to the history 
of aggregate volatility) seems to deter the development of a long-term credit market 
for SMEs, in particular in Argentina, and also appears to be responsible for the small 
number of unsecured loans offered. In both countries, a high percentage of banks’ 
portfolios are collateralized. However, it is surprising that the other half of the 
Argentine banks do not consider macroeconomic factors significant, given that the 
Argentine crisis occurred only six years ago.  
Fourth, regulations are regarded as significant obstacles by half of the Chilean 
banks, but by only 20% of the Argentine banks. However, to put this finding in 
context, it is important to note that bank responses in Chile are driven by just one 
particular regulation: the ceiling on interest rates. It is not the case that banks in that 
country view the general regulatory environment as an obstacle. On the other hand, in 
Argentina, although banks consider regulations to be reasonable, they mention a 
broad variety of regulatory aspects that could still be improved, which suggests that 
                                                 
32 The use of coping mechanisms in emerging market financial contracts is already documented in de la 
Torre and Schmukler (2004). 
  17banks perceive the regulatory environment to be more broadly constraining than the 
one in Chile. First, documentation requirements continue to be costly for SMEs and 
could be simplified to some extent. Second, regulations impede banks to lend to 
SMEs with pension debts or tax arrears. Third, more flexibility to deal with the large 
informality of SMEs (especially the smallest ones) is mentioned. Fourth, regulatory 
requirements are more demanding for banks than for other financial intermediaries 
such as mutuales and cooperatives (which are not regulated by the Central Bank), 
leading SMEs to obtain financing outside of the banking system and, consequently, 
giving rise to “regulatory arbitrage.” Fifth, taxes on financial transactions in 
Argentina and Chile (check tax and stamp tax, respectively) have a negative effect on 
SME lending because they deter financial intermediation of SMEs. This reduces the 
ability of banks to learn about some clients by looking at their history of banking 
operations and it also makes cross-selling harder. Although the stamp tax is only 
mentioned by Chilean banks, some Argentine provinces are also affected by a stamp 
tax. In neither country do public banks consider regulations to be a significant 
obstacle, while private domestic banks in both countries claim that regulations are an 
impediment. However, despite these specific issues, banks consider that regulatory 
requirements are either appropriate and beneficial or inconsequential. Indeed, many 
banks acknowledge that in absence of these regulations they would ask SMEs for the 
same information.  
Fifth, lack of adequate demand is thought to be a significant obstacle by half 
of the Argentine banks interviewed, while none of the Chilean banks see it as 
relevant. Although some banks consider demand to be strong, they point out that 
many SMEs are not creditworthy (or not as creditworthy as they could be) due to the 
high levels of informality. In Argentina, anecdotal evidence from the interviewed 
  18banks suggests that around 30% of the SMEs are served by financial entities. Most 
banks believe that there are plenty of worthy enterprises among the 70% that are 
underserved and that for unknown reasons do not approach banks.
33 Hence, in an 
attempt to increase their involvement with the segment, there is strong competition 
over the high-quality SMEs that are already in the market and a significant outreach 
effort to attract those that are creditworthy but still outside the market. Also, banks 
state that SMEs demand mostly long-term loans with low fixed-rates, while banks 
primarily offer short-term variable-rate loans. Only one Argentine bank mentions that 
SMEs still lack confidence in banks after the crisis and that they prefer self-financing. 
Interestingly, banks declare that a large portion of approved credit lines are not fully 
used.  
The obstacles given the lowest importance are the legal and contractual 
environment, the lending technology to SMEs, and bank-specific factors. Banks in 
Argentina acknowledge that the lending mechanisms and procedures are not simple, 
but they have developed know-how so that this does not represent an important 
obstacle. Some issues related to the legal and contractual environment are: the 
judiciary inefficiency, the weakness of contract and collateral enforcement, slow and 
costly bankruptcy procedures, and the weak protection of investors and property 
rights. However, banks have adapted their products to counter such obstacles by 
offering short-term, secured products that can be easily converted to cash, and usually 
by demanding a personal guarantee from SME owners (or their spouses). They also 
avoid filing for bankruptcy, and they generally carry out debt restructuring and out-of-
                                                 
33 Another study (Fundación Capital, 2006) presents alternative reasons to explain the lack of demand 
for credit from SMEs in Argentina. Among them we can find that 45.3% of SMEs do not apply 
because they are using other sources or do not need financing, 13.4% consider that interest rates are too 
high, 4.3% think that banks ask for too many requirements like balances, cash flows, fiscal situation of 
the firm and years as a bank’s client, 3.4% of SMEs do not have a collateral and 2.6% do not trust in 
banks. 
  19court settlements. The current macroeconomic situation, characterized by excess 
liquidity and low levels of default, is very favorable and mitigates these institutional 
deficiencies. Bank-specific factors are mostly mentioned by public banks, which 
recognize that they are more inefficient than private banks (in particular foreign 
banks), and they believe that this inefficiency discourages good SMEs from 
approaching them. The lack of qualified personnel is mentioned by both Argentine 
and Chilean banks as an obstacle for bank involvement with SMEs. Other bank-
specific aspects mentioned are the fact that banks are learning to do business with 
SMEs and that the geographic presence of banks is limited. As for the nature of SME 
lending technology, banks point out the high fixed-costs, the difficulty to standardize 
risk management and apply scoring, and the difficulty in standardizing products.  
When asked about possible areas in which government action could help 
enhance banks’ incentives to increase SME lending, banks mostly mention the 
judicial, legal, and regulatory areas (Figure 5). Regarding the legal and judicial areas, 
Argentine banks consider that judicial processes are slow and that bankruptcy and 
insolvency laws are ineffective, while Chilean banks mostly mention the distortive 
effects of the stamp tax. Regarding regulations, Argentine banks highlight the need to 
improve the definition of guarantees and consider that the frequency of information 
requests should be lower in some cases, while Chilean banks mention that the interest 
rate ceiling should be removed and would like to be able to share guarantees. In 
general, banks both in Argentina and Chile wish to increase guarantees or subsidies, 
and both are fairly comfortable with the institutional environment. Some of the 
institutional improvements that Argentine banks consider would be beneficial are 
related to law enforcement and collateral execution processes, which banks point out, 
are hindering long-term financing. According to Argentine banks, the government 
  20should continue promoting the development of reciprocal guarantee societies (SGRs). 
On the other hand, Chilean banks demand for an expedited payment of FOGAPE 
guarantees. More government work is needed to enhance credit bureaus, but the 
majority of the banks consider that the existence of public credit bureaus already 
plays a crucial role in facilitating SME lending.
34 In particular, Argentine banks state 
that the quality of the information should be enhanced and they would also like more 
information on companies, such as total amount of credit lines and guarantees in the 
banking system. Chilean banks would like financial statements to be available in 
order to assess companies’ income-generating capacity.  
Similar to what Table 2 does for drivers, Table 4 shows how obstacles vary by 
country and bank characteristics. The table shows that competition in the SME 
segment seems to be more of an obstacle for Argentine banks and for those with a 
higher market share. Consistent with the general expectations, macroeconomic factors 
are more important for Argentine banks. Interestingly, they are more relevant for 
private banks (both domestic and foreign), perhaps because public banks receive 
public assistance or might benefit in relative terms during turbulent times (when 
companies turn to them). Macroeconomic factors are also less important for large 
banks. Regulations are less relevant for Argentine banks, though this result is driven 
by the specific Chilean ceiling on interest rates (see next section). Furthermore, 
private domestic banks see regulations as more binding. Lack of adequate demand is 
perceived to be more important in Argentina and by private banks, but less so for 
banks with wider geographical presence. Banks not only view the legal and 
contractual environment as non-binding, but Table 4 also shows that there are no 
differences on how they vary across countries and banks. The same happens with 
                                                 
34 Credit bureaus are considered to facilitate SME lending according to 92% of Argentine banks and 
75% of Chilean banks.   
  21bank-specific factors. The nature of lending technology is less of an obstacle for both 
types of private banks relative to public ones. In sum, this analysis highlights that 
although there are many similarities on how banks perceive the obstacles some 
differences arise, which might help shape policymaking. 
 
6.  Competition and Government Programs in the SME Segment 
This section covers two remaining aspects that shape bank involvement with 
SMEs. First we analyze how competitive the market is. Second, we discuss to what 
extent banks’ interest in serving SMEs is based on incentives generated through 
government programs. 
According to most banks, the SME market is promising. However, there is no 
agreement on the size of the market, even within the same country. The market is 
large according to 70% of the banks in Argentina and 50% of the banks in Chile, 
while it is considered to be small by around 30% of the banks in both countries. This 
discrepancy is likely due to the fact that the SME universe is not clearly identified in 
either country. In Argentina, as an approach to resolving this issue, a program by 
SEPyME called “MAPA PyME,” is being launched. This SMEs Sub-Secretary 
program tries to describe the SMEs’ universe based on an assessment of all formal 
SMEs in the country.  
Banks still have a fair amount of outreach to do despite the strong demand for 
bank services observed in the SME segment, according to 81% of the banks. 
Although SME demand does not make use of all the available credit offered by the 
banking system, banks point out that demand is indeed growing strongly. However, as 
mentioned above, SMEs that seek credit are not always creditworthy. Many banks 
believe that there are “high-quality” SMEs that could benefit from accessing bank 
  22financing but that do not approach banks for unknown reasons. Therefore, banks feel 
the need to reach out to these SMEs. High competition over the best SMEs that are 
already in the market also explains the need to make efforts to attract new SME 
clients. Banks rely on the pro-active role of relationship managers, and some banks 
even carry out special campaigns to attract SMEs. One bank states that since SMEs do 
not react to advertisements as promptly as consumers, efforts to attract them are 
greater.  
The market is highly competitive, but unsaturated. High competition in the 
SME segment could also explain the need to reach out to SMEs. All the banks 
interviewed believe that the SME segment is competitive. However, there is no 
consensus on the degree of saturation of the market; 80% of the banks believe there is 
still room for new competitors, while the rest believes the SME market is saturated. 
Note that this result does not necessarily contradict the result on Figure 4, which 
shows that banks in Argentina (as opposed to Chile) consider that competition in the 
segment is an obstacle to their involvement with SMEs. The differences regarding the 
obstacles might come from the fact that Argentina has many more banks in the system 
and that most of them are trying to engage with SMEs. In Chile, there are fewer banks 
(25 versus 67 in Argentina), with a larger and probably more stable market share 
each. So even though they still compete, Chilean banks do not perceive this 
competition to be an obstacle. Furthermore, banks in these countries might require 
different rates of return to enter the market. If Argentina is perceived as more volatile 
than Chile (as most surveys suggest), Argentine banks would compete in a segment if 
there is less competition and thus higher expected returns.  
The structure of the SME loan market differs between Argentina and Chile, 
and there is no full agreement within the countries. Among Argentine banks, 62% of 
  23the banks perceive that the market is atomized, 23% believe a small number of banks 
dominate the market, and only 15% deem it to be segmented. In Chile, the answers 
are not as dispersed: 75% of the Chilean banks consider that the SME loan market is 
dominated by a small number of banks and 13% see it as a segmented market. To 
summarize, in Argentina most of the banks perceive the market to be atomized, while 
in Chile the prevailing belief is that a small number of banks dominate the market 
(Figure 6.A).  
The main players in the SME market are large private banks, according to the 
majority of the banks in Argentina and Chile. They are followed in importance by 
public banks and niche banks. Other financial intermediaries and small banks also 
play a relevant role in the SME loan market, although a minority of the banks 
interviewed consider these to be main players (Figure 6.B). 
There have been significant changes over time in SME lending in terms of 
competition, consolidation, and entry, according to 70% of the banks. In both 
countries many banks have participated in the segment for years, but others are 
entering with very aggressive policies. Another significant finding is that almost 62% 
of the banks in both countries believe that banks lend to SMEs after seeing other 
banks do so. Almost 60% of the banks believe that there is a first mover’s advantage: 
client’s loyalty, brand identification, and know-how of the market are the most 
frequently mentioned advantages. Although more than half of the banks answer that 
there is a first movers’ advantage, the difference in perceptions is significant across 
bank types. Most private domestic banks consider that a first movers’ advantage does 
exist while public banks deny it. Most foreign banks answer affirmatively in 
Argentina. In Chile the process of capturing SME clients appears to be more advanced 
than in Argentina: while in Argentina SMEs usually have five or six banks serving 
  24them in different aspects of their business, the Chilean market has evolved to the point 
that an SME is only served by one or two banks, which offer an ample variety of 
products and services to fulfill the needs of SMEs. In Chile the importance of the 
relationship manager appears to be crucial for SMEs when choosing banks. 
Despite all this competition, the Argentine and Chilean governments have 
implemented several programs to promote the involvement of banks in the SME 
segment. But these incentives notwithstanding, only half of the banks interviewed 
claim that they use these programs (still, 80% believes their overall effect is positive). 
Furthermore, these programs are not an important determinant of bank involvement 
with the segment. Indeed, banks do not base their relation with SMEs on these 
programs. Banks might use them, but they are not the key driver of their involvement. 
Although all types of banks view these programs favorably, in terms of additionality 
generated there seems to be some disagreement.  
In Argentina, all banks are familiar with government programs, but none 
consider them essential. The most frequently mentioned programs are the interest rate 
subsidies offered by the SME Secretary (SEPyME), and the Argentine National 
Guarantee System (that includes Reciprocal Guarantee Societies, SGRs). FONTAR 
(Argentine Technological Fund), and the credit lines offered by the Inter-American 
Development Bank are also mentioned but banks do not believe they have a 
significant impact. Most Argentine banks believe that the additionality generated by 
these programs is very low. Although 90% of the banks use the interest rate subsidy, 
they claim that they do not make use of it to attract new clients, but rather to lower the 
rate or increase credit to existing clients. Only a few private domestic and public 
banks state that the SEPyME interest rate subsidy generates additionality. The SGRs 
are employed by almost 20% of the banks interviewed and they are mostly used to 
  25increase the credit line to existing clients. Only private domestic banks claim that 
these guarantee societies allow them to attract new clients.  
Most Chilean banks make use of government programs and believe these 
programs do generate additionality. In Chile the programs FECU-PyME (Uniform 
Codified Reporting Scheme for SMEs), CORFO (Corporation for Production 
Promotion), and FOGAPE (Small Enterprise Guarantee Fund) are considered most 
relevant by banks. Most Chilean banks indicate that the programs FOGAPE and 
CORFO do generate additionality, mainly by attracting new clients. Foreign banks 
seem to be among the ones that benefit the most from these programs. FECU-PyME 
is mostly used by private banks, but they do not see it as a program that generates 
additionality, while Chile Compite is only used by one private domestic bank 
interviewed.  
 
7.  Conclusions 
Using evidence from banks in Argentina and Chile, this paper explored the 
drivers and obstacles that shape bank involvement with SMEs and, in particular, 
investigated to what degree the competitive and institutional environments appear to 
play an important role. We find that SMEs have become a strategic sector for banks. 
This signals a gap in perceptions since it contradicts the view that banks are not 
interested in serving SMEs. Furthermore, banks’ interest in SMEs is not based on 
government programs. Instead, this change seems to be explained in part by 
decreasing profits in other segments due to the emerging competition, which in turn 
encourages banks to look for new markets as the growth potential based on the 
consumer and corporate sectors declines. Banks focus on SMEs because they estimate 
that the segment’s elevated profits will more than compensate for the higher implied 
  26costs and risks. Furthermore, banks might be attracted by the increasing participation 
of SMEs in the productive chains of the economy. This occurs in a context of 
apparent significant changes in industrial organization, in which large corporations 
outsource processes and actively support their SME clients and suppliers to foster 
their own growth.  
Banks consider that the SME lending market is large, unsaturated, and 
prospects are optimistic in both countries. The importance of the SME segment has 
grown to the point that most banks have created separate units to serve it and compete 
intensively among themselves to try to capture new SMEs as clients. In other words, 
the engagement between banks and SMEs has become integral since banks offer 
SMEs a great variety of services and lending products. This questions the traditional 
focus of the literature on banks connecting to SMEs through relationship lending.
35 In 
the case of international banks present in both countries, the strategies to engage 
SMEs across countries are remarkably similar. Although the SME universe is not 
clearly identified in Argentina or Chile, banks are aware of the large number of high-
quality, untapped SMEs that could benefit from accessing bank financing and, 
consequently, banks are actively reaching out to them. 
Since banks have developed coping mechanisms that help them overcome 
some of the obstacles in SME financing, the particular institutional environment in 
each country is not considered by most banks a binding constraint for financing 
SMEs. Namely, the potential benefits of serving SMEs more than compensate for the 
possible institutional deficiencies, given that banks can reduce the risk of dealing with 
the segment. Among other things, banks have developed the mechanisms to deal with 
informality, regulatory requirements, documentation and paperwork burden, and the 
                                                 
35 See de la Torre, Martinez Pería, and Schmukler (2008). 
  27costly constitution of guarantees. Needless to say, this imposes an extra cost to the 
system. For example, banks have limited the range of products they offer to SMEs to 
cope with macroeconomic and contractual risk.
36 They offer mostly short-term, 
secured products, making an intense use of immovable guarantees and always 
demanding the owners’ guarantee. Furthermore, perhaps another consequence of the 
institutional shortcomings is that banks’ engagement with SMEs is based primarily on 
services rather than loans, reducing banks’ exposure to SME risk.
37 The institutional 
environment is likely to be more relevant for other types of financing, like long-term 
loans in fixed rates in domestic currency and for countries with weaker institutional 
frameworks. For the types of cases analyzed in this paper, policy action might focus 
on complementing what banks need to expand their participation and provide the type 
of financing that might still be lacking.  
Although the surveys were conducted at one point in time, banks were able to 
describe to us the previous evolution of their engagement with SMEs and their 
perspectives for future engagement. This type of evidence points to a structural 
change in the relation between banks and SMEs: Argentina and Chile appear to be 
facing an embryonic “bancarization” of the SME segment. Banks have discovered a 
key, untapped segment and are making substantial investments to develop the relation 
with SMEs and compete for them. Moreover, banks are developing the internal 
structures and mechanisms to work with SMEs, adapting their business and risk 
models to reduce the costs and risks of the segment. As part of this process, banks still 
need to obtain better measures of their exposure to the segment in terms of income, 
costs, or risk. Thus, there seems to be a learning process through which banks are 
                                                 
36 The ability to cope with risk is observed in emerging economies in general; see de la Torre and 
Schmukler (2004). 
37 See de la Torre, Martinez Pería, and Schmukler (2008). 
  28developing the structure to deal with SMEs. Still, some changes might occur as the 
macroeconomic cycle turns, since the favorable macroeconomic conjuncture mitigates 
the institutional deficiencies as the banking system has witnessed historically high 
levels of liquidity and low levels of non-performing loans. 
The structural changes in the relation between banks and SMEs do not mean 
that cyclical factors have been unimportant. Part of the move toward SME lending 
could be explained by the overall macroeconomic stability, high liquidity, and low 
rates observed in Argentina and Chile in the years prior to the surveys, which might 
have contributed to the saturation of the market for consumer and corporate loans. 
Given the crisis that started in the US sub-prime sector and is spreading around the 
world, it would be interesting to see how banks are revising their strategies. Anecdotal 
evidence suggest that banks still maintain a high interest in serving SMEs, because 
they view the recent increase in the demand from large corporates (unable to tap funds 
in capital markets during crisis times) as temporary.  
Despite the involvement of banks with SMEs, there is still substantial room to 
improve SME financing, which requires action on behalf of banks, SMEs, and 
policymakers. SMEs would probably benefit from an expanded offer of long-term 
credit and would likely gain more access to finance if they reduced their levels of 
informality. Authorities could facilitate this process of formalizing the SMEs’ 
economic activity. Governments could also help by improving the overall institutional 
environment, working with the private sector in the specific rules and regulations that 
might be hindering the development of long-term financing. But the rules and 
regulations for markets to be completed are very specific to each country, as evident 
from the bank responses described in this paper. For example, banks in Chile mention 
that allowing guarantees to be shared could unlock credit.  
  29Access to information seems crucial to make progress in SME financing. In 
particular, improving the infrastructure that provides information seems to be a key 
aspect that could enhance financing to SMEs. This involves the supply side of 
financing (banks), the demand side (SMEs), and the government, which regulates and 
shapes the institutional environment. For example, the lack of adequate information 
regarding the SME universe is an important problem to be tackled and governments 
could help substantially with it. It would be especially useful to identify the universe 
of SMEs and to quantify the share of SMEs that actually has access to finance. 
Moreover, given the banks’ interest in serving SMEs, having more information about 
the actual needs of SMEs (from the financial sector) would be important to help guide 
future reform efforts. On the supply/bank side, additional information could also help, 
such as the percentage of SMEs that are rejected by banks when applying for a loan 
and the contribution of the segment to banks’ income, costs, and risks. Governments 
could also help reduce the existing information gap by increasing the flow of 
information regarding the evolution of the SME market, for example, by making 
SMEs’ balance sheets public and easily available. Of course, improving information 
availability would be easier to accomplish for medium-sized enterprises than for small 
ones, given the smaller number of medium-sized companies and their relative 
visibility, sophistication, and capacity to act as large corporations. 
Finally, the analysis from this paper leads us to two final conclusions. First, to 
the extent that there is a trade off in government actions, governments could increase 
their attention to reducing the cost of lending to SMEs (so banks lend more), rather 
than increasing the government programs that foster the quantity of lending itself. For 
example, governments could help reduce the informational gaps and change the 
specific rules and regulations that inhibit banks to have a deeper and more long-term 
  30involvement with SMEs. Second, the fact that banks learn to operate in the different 
institutional environments does not mean that there could not be several 
improvements in this area (which are particular to each country and circumstance) 
that would foster SME lending even more.  
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Switzerland. Bivariate Multivariate Bivariate Multivariate Bivariate Multivariate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Country 0.091 0.037 0.039 0.043 0.072 0.148**
(0.153) (0.139) (0.046) (0.047) (0.046) (0.069)
Private foreign -0.511*** -0.535*** -0.059 -0.084 -0.068 -0.041
(0.122) (0.142) (0.073) (0.062) (0.140) (0.082)
Private domestic -0.060 -0.103 0.059 0.037 -0.080 -0.048
(0.104) (0.145) (0.086) (0.069) (0.136) (0.070)
Location -0.232 -0.029 -0.119* -0.044 0.017 0.060
(0.144) (0.190) (0.061) (0.067) (0.067) (0.085)
Market share -0.363 -0.407 -0.272 -0.081 0.439 0.634*
(0.404) (0.763) (0.304) (0.314) (0.481) (0.382)
Constant 0.806*** 1.144*** 0.095** 0.166** 0.091*** -0.020
(0.134) (0.216) (0.038) (0.078) (0.020) (0.097)
No. of observations 36 26 29
Bivariate Multivariate Bivariate Multivariate Bivariate Multivariate
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Country 0.024 -0.015 0.209*** 0.082 0.263*** 0.250***
(0.037) (0.045) (0.054) (0.061) (0.064) (0.044)
Private foreign 0.067 0.079 0.208*** 0.171*** -0.049 -0.086
(0.052) (0.054) (0.059) (0.054) (0.078) (0.069)
Private domestic 0.057 0.061** 0.113* 0.104* 0.222** 0.174**
(0.040) (0.029) (0.060) (0.056) (0.092) (0.073)
Location -0.056 -0.070 -0.227** -0.087 -0.214 0.074
(0.073) (0.094) (0.101) (0.112) (0.133) (0.133)
Market share -0.161 -0.052 -1.997*** -0.867* -1.230*** -0.449
(0.242) (0.202) (0.604) (0.501) (0.407) (0.406)
Constant 0.097*** 0.115 0.084*** 0.175* 0.150*** 0.094
(0.019) (0.085) (0.019) (0.102) (0.042) (0.098)
No. of observations 30 23 35
Table 1
Bank involvement with SMEs
Amount of loans Number of loans
Number of branches Number of personnel Number of deposits
Number of debtors
Share dedicated to SMEs
Share dedicated to SMEs
This table presents Tobit regressions of diverse measures of the degree of bank involvement with SMEs on country and bank attributes. The regressions are
bounded between zero and one since all of the dependent variables are expressed as fractions. Bivariate and multivariate regressions are presented in
separate columns. The bivariate column presents estimates for different bivariate regressions, where the number of observations vary by regression.
Standard errors are in parenthesis. The dependent variables are the percentage of the number branches, personnel, deposits, debtors, loans, plus the amount
of loans dedicated to SMEs, using data for 2005 and 2006. Regarding the independent variables, the dummy country takes the value one for Argentina and
zero for Chile. Private foreign and private domestic are dummy variables that represent the type of bank (both are included for the bivariate regression); the
benchmark is domestic public banks. Location represents the percentage of regions in the country in which the bank has branches. Market share represents
the share of the bank's net assets relative to the total net assets of the sample of banks in each country. *, **, *** represent 10%, 5% and 1% significance
levels, respectively.Bivariate Multivariate Bivariate Multivariate Bivariate Multivariate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Country -0.017 0.501 -0.994* -0.281 0.107 -0.116
(0.613) (0.717) (0.581) (0.799) (0.575) (0.829)
Private foreign 6.345*** 6.733*** -0.127 0.357 4.772*** 4.801***
(0.603) (1.184) (0.816) (0.857) (0.690) (0.627)
Private domestic -0.311 -0.135 -0.236 0.251 5.943*** 6.049***
(0.625) (0.918) (0.790) (0.963) (0.836) (0.348)
Location 0.576 0.381 0.926 -1.022 0.078 0.085
(0.691) (1.099) (1.014) (1.161) (0.740) (1.041)
Market share 1.227 2.331 14.515*** 16.375*** 1.289 1.836
(3.669) (4.781) (4.901) (6.076) (3.745) (5.087)
No. of observations 19 18 19
R-squared 0.288 0.249 0.149
Bivariate Multivariate Bivariate Multivariate Bivariate Multivariate
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Country -0.854 -1.675* -1.109* -1.248 1.102* 1.546**
(0.601) (0.884) (0.618) (0.862) (0.606) (0.617)
Private foreign -0.841 -0.290 -1.006 -1.053 0.473 0.086
(1.181) (1.333) (1.170) (1.073) (0.573) (0.835)
Private domestic -1.197 -0.759 -1.196 -0.850 0.038 -0.625
(1.161) (1.284) (1.122) (1.058) (0.592) (0.795)
Location -0.447 -2.215* 0.459 -0.408 -0.079 1.168
(0.758) (1.331) (0.846) (1.277) (0.680) (1.073)
Market share 2.078 1.150 3.414 0.702 -2.320 -3.843
(2.979) (3.707) (2.904) (4.421) (2.482) (3.279)
No. of observations 19 19 20
R-squared 0.161 0.137 0.130
Perceived profitability in      
SME segment
Posibility to team up with      
large clients
Excessive exposure to         
large corporates
Excessive exposure to         
retail customers sector
Intense competition for        
large corporates
Intense competition for        
retail customers
Table 2
Drivers of bank involvement with SMEs
This table presents ordered Probit regressions of diverse measures of the degree of bank involvement with SMEs on country and bank
attributes. Bivariate and multivariate regressions are presented in separate columns. The bivariate column presents estimates for different
bivariate regressions, where the number of observations vary by regression. Standard errors are in parenthesis. The dependent variables are
ranked from one to five, representing the degree to which banks consider each driver to be significant in their involvement with SMEs, one
being not significant and five extremely significant. Regarding the independent variables, the dummy country takes the value one for
Argentina and zero for Chile. Private foreign and private domestic are dummyvariables that represent the type of bank (both are included for
the bivariate regression); the benchmark is domestic public banks. Location represents the percentage of regions in the country in which the
bank has branches. Market share represents the share of the bank's net assets relative to the total net assets of the sample of banks in each
country.  *, **, *** represent 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.Type of obstacle
Argentina Chile
SME-specific factors 46% 50% Scoring is inadequate
Informality
Lack of quality information
Cannot evaluate SMEs based on behavior
Costs to improve information are high
Family management
Lack of adequate guarantees
Competition 69% 13% Difficult to continue growing
Narrow margins
Private banks in high quality segments
Public banks distort the market
Unfair competitors (strong private and public banks)
Macroeconomic 46% 13% Long term instability
Ceiling prices
Exchange rate or interest rate risk
Ban on exports
Regulations 23% 50% Too much documentation required
Ceiling rates
Inflexibility
Financial transaction taxes  / Stamp tax
Obstacles in foreign exchange transactions
Regulation forces banks to act as tax authorities
Legal and contractual  31% 38% Judicial inefficiency
environment Judicial insecurity / dependent on politics
Bankruptcy process very costly
Lack of contract enforcement
Nature of SME lending 23% 38% Costly
technology Difficult to standardize risk management (scoring and rating)
Need to adapt commercial model
Difficult to standardize products and procedures
High entry costs
Lack of adequate  46% 0% Supply exceeds demand
demand SMEs only demand low fixed rates in pesos
SMEs prefer self-financing
SMEs think banks are tough
Bank-specific factors 23% 13% Some banks are new to the segment 
Inefficiency
Lack of technology and qualified personnel
Lack of expert analyst in commercial and risk sectors
Limited geographic presence
Table 3
Obstacles to bank involvement with SMEs
Percentage of banks that 
consider the obstacle at least 
significant
Frequently mentioned factors
Banks were asked to list up to three important factors that are obstacles to their involvement with SMEs. This table lists the
most frequently mentioned factors and repeats the information illustrated in Figure 4 by presenting the percentage of banks
that consider each type of obstacle significant, verysignificant, or extremelysignificant. The percentage of banks that consider
these factors marginally significant or not significant is not presented in the table. Banks were asked to “Indicate to what
degree the following factors are important obstacles to your exposure to SMEs. Rate them and specify up to the three most
important aspects within these categories."Bivariate Multivariate Bivariate Multivariate Bivariate Multivariate Bivariate Multivariate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Country 6.201*** 7.317*** -0.911* -2.519** 0.331 0.744 -0.251 -1.106
(0.764) (2.697) (0.540) (1.050) (0.567) (0.577) (0.522) (0.713)
Private foreign 5.946** 7.515*** 0.558 0.952 0.760 1.117 -0.011 0.069
(2.529) (2.336) (0.762) (0.586) (0.874) (0.950) (0.823) (0.930)
Private domestic 5.948** 7.238*** 2.074*** 3.790*** 0.304 0.617 0.374 0.498
(2.501) (1.904) (0.678) (0.790) (0.912) (0.961) (0.818) (0.852)
Location -0.600 -0.383 0.321 -1.062 0.611 0.609 -1.205 -1.664
(0.948) (1.827) (0.937) (0.965) (0.784) (1.012) (0.763) (1.457)
Market share -7.672* 4.115 -0.364 2.952 1.229 2.804 -5.432 -4.344
(4.401) (13.935) (3.059) (3.002) (3.170) (5.153) (3.417) (4.069)
No. of observations 19 20 20 19
R-squared 0.253 0.405 0.070 0.120
Bivariate Multivariate Bivariate Multivariate Bivariate Multivariate Bivariate Multivariate
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Country 0.183 -0.014 -0.005 -0.566 1.687*** 1.632*** 6.192*** 11.582***
(0.474) (0.547) (0.629) (0.892) (0.589) (0.532) (0.357) (4.030)
Private foreign -0.754 -0.919 -7.150*** -7.025*** -0.898 -1.705 5.453*** 12.317***
(0.510) (0.818) (0.605) (0.907) (1.013) (1.305) (0.617) (4.363)
Private domestic 0.099 -0.083 -5.912*** -5.720*** 0.730 0.342 6.024*** 12.592***
(0.638) (0.733) (0.417) (0.845) (1.066) (1.189) (0.820) (4.232)
Location -0.403 0.050 -1.155 -1.453 -1.811 -0.309 -1.344* -3.062**
(0.784) (1.308) (0.747) (1.156) (1.132) (1.333) (0.691) (1.559)
Market share -1.097 -1.802 -0.358 1.317 -4.625* -6.830 -7.653 26.957
(3.287) (4.273) (4.376) (5.652) (2.504) (4.172) (5.685) (18.070)
No. of observations 20 19 19 20
R-squared 0.055 0.278 0.340 0.391
Table 4
Obstacles to bank involvement with SMEs
Macroeconomic factors
SME-specific factors Nature of the lending technology
Regulations
Competition in the SME 
segment
Lack of adequate demand
Bank specific factors Legal and contractual 
This table presents ordered Probit regressions of diverse obstacles to bank involvement with SMEs on country and bank attributes. Bivariate and multivariate regressions are
presented in separate columns. The bivariate column presents estimates for different bivariate regressions, where the number of observations vary by regression. Standard errors
are in parenthesis. The dependent variables are ranked from one to five, representing the degree to which banks consider each obstacle to be significantly affecting their
involvement with SMEs, one being not significant and five extremely significant. Regarding the independent variables, the dummy country takes the value one for Argentina and
zero for Chile. Private foreign and private domestic are dummy variables that represent the type of bank (both are included for the bivariate regression); the benchmark is
domestic public banks. Location represents the percentage of regions in the country in which the bank has branches. Market share represents the share of the bank's net assets
relative to the total net assets of the sample of banks in each country.  *, **, *** represent 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.Main products offered to SMEs
Figure 1
Products offered to SMEs (I)
This figure shows the range of products that banks offer to SMEs and the percentage of banks that mentioned each product. "Other" includes insurance products,






















































Factoring OtherWeighted average according to bank lending of each product 
B. Average term of main lending products to SMEs                                                          
Figure 2
Products offered to SMEs (II)
The source of this figure is the data collected from banks, for 2006. The banks that answered the information displayed in Figure 2.A represent
approximately 40% of the private sector loans in each country and the banks that answered the information displayed in Figure 2.B represent between
15% and 20% of loans to the private sector in each country. Figure 2.B displays the weighted average of the terms of the main lending products to
SMEs, weighted according to the amount of each product that each bank lends.









































































































sBanks were asked to indicate to what degree their involvement with SMEs is driven by the factors presented in this figure. The options available to
qualify the importance of these factors vary from not significant to extremely significant/crucial. This figure shows the percentage of banks that
consider these factors significant, very significant, or extremely significant/crucial drivers. The percentage of banks that consider these factors
marginally significant or not significant is not presented. It should be noted that "Social objective" and "Strategic sector" are not factors given by the
questionnaire, but they are mentioned as a relevant factor by some banks. “Other segments” refers to the corporate and/or retail segments. Banks were
asked “To what degree is your involvementwith SMEs driven by the following?:i) Perceived profitability in the SME segment, ii) Intense competition
for large corporations, iii) Intense competition for retail customers, iv) Excessive exposure to large corporations, v) Excessive exposure to retail
customer service, vi) Possibility to seek out SMEs through existing relations with large clients (e.g. reverse factoring), and vii) Other (specify).”
























































Obstacles to bank involvement with SMEs
Banks were asked to indicate to what degree the factors observed in the figure are important obstacles to their exposure to SMEs. This
figure shows the percentage of banks that consider each factor significant, very significant, or extremely significant/crucial. The
percentage of banks that consider these factors marginally significant or not significant is not presented in the figure. Banks were asked to
"Indicate to what degree the following factors are important obstacles to their exposure to SMEs. Rate them and specify up to the three






































































Role of the government
This figure displays the percentage of banks that answer affirmatively that government actions could increase the appeal of SME lending
in each area. Banks were asked: "Do you think the government could increase the appeal of SME lending through actions in the following
areas?”






































Judicial Legal Regulatory Insitutional Guarantees Credit bureaus Subsidies
Argentina ChileFigure 6
Market structure
B. Who are the main players in SME financing?
A. What is the market structure of the SME loan market?
This figure analyzes the SME lending market structure and the main players in the market as perceived by banks. For Figure 6.A banks


































Small number of banks
dominate the market
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